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1. INTRODUCTION 
  In an economically-globalised world, market-promoting reforms seem to be an imperative 
for policy-makers. When the former socialist economies entered the world market economy, this 
thesis  looked  particularly  appealing.  It  was  believed  that  they  had  been  unsuccessfully 
experimenting with what has been called a ‘state socialist model’ whose eventual demise would 
have paved the way to the unabridged functioning of market forces. At the same time, progress in 
the process of reform differed across countries, and these differences have persisted (EBRD, 2009) 
and  translated  into  distinct  politico-economic  and  institutional  configurations  (Bohle  and 
Greskovits, 2007). Frequently, intellectual endeavours tended to pack reforms into the two boxes: a 
‘big bang’/‘shock therapy’ versus a ‘gradualist’ approach, while leaving some outliers (such as 
Vietnam and China) beyond that dichotomy (World Bank, 1996). Later, a somewhat more careful 
classification  suggested  the  existence  of  in-between  cases  (e.g.  Poland  and  Czechoslovakia  in 
1991–1992, Hungary until 1995, and Russia in the 1990s). Indeed, it is nearly impossible to allocate 
countries between the two poles: all of them have experienced policy changes and reversals so that 
the transition process(es) have not been uniform at best (Lavigne, 1999, pp. 118–120; Gross and 
Steinherr, 1995). For instance, a real ‘shock therapy’ program in Hungary was implemented only in 
1995 (and not at the start of transformation), as the right-wing coalition favouring gradualism was 
superseded by the new government with a different ideological stance towards reforms (Lavigne, 
1999, p. 119). 
In  some  countries,  reforms  stagnated  if  not  came  to  a  halt,  reflecting  stable  political 
economy coalitions of social actors (Przeworski, 1991; Hellman, 1998; Havrylyshyn and Smee, 
2000). The EU membership played an important role: in East-Central European and the Baltic 
States, the political elites and the populations were driven by the willingness to ‘return to normality’ 
(Laux, 2000, p. 268) through fully-fledged EU membership. In contrast, the former Soviet Union 2 
republics have not accepted this goal and continued to be locked-in in-between the manipulated and 
the  market  economy,  backwardness  and  modernity.  The  co-existence  of  both  features  in  these 
seemingly unified economies suggests looking at the concept of ‘dualism’. 
Development  economics  has  accumulated  some  familiarity  with  the  concept  of  ‘dual 
economy’ (Lewis, 1954; Fei and Ranis, 1961; Hayami and Ruttan, 1971), namely of an economy 
where a (small) manufacturing  sector  and a backward (mainly  agricultural) sector coexist. The 
modern sector is typically an enclave operating ‘more or less like any modern industrial economy’ 
(Basu, 1997, p. 151), surrounded by a much larger outdated sector, where the modes of production 
are more primitive. In this context, development has been associated with the expansion of the 
modern sector and the shrinkage of the traditional (agricultural) sector. However, dualism is not 
confined to the production alone, but often reflects differences in ‘social systems, racial or ethnic 
backgrounds, demographic behaviour, consumer expenditure and consumer savings behaviour, and 
the domestic and foreign sectors’ (Kelley et al., 1972. p. 8).  
For the transition economies, the problem was not industrialisation, but re-industrialisation 
or even deindustrialisation, and, crucially, the reorganisation of the existing industries in such a way 
that profit-making and competitiveness considerations could prevail over loss-making and stock-
piling  activities  flourishing  under  the  state  socialist  system  of  soft  budget  constraints  (Kornai, 
1980). Also in these economies dualism can go beyond the production sphere and affect even the 
monetary  domain.  For  instance,  the  economies  of  the  former  USSR  are  all  characterised  by 
significant rates of dollarization, namely by the widespread use of a foreign currency coexisting 
with the domestic currency (Feige and Dean, 2004), while for the new member states of the EU that 
belonged to the socialist camp the experience of dollarisation was rather short (Haiduk et al., 2004). 
It can be argued that a dualistic development is not a specific feature of some individual 
country, since it has been observed in many transition economies albeit at different periods of time 
in the course of transformation (Myant, 1993; Nielsen, 1996; Winiecki, 1993). Governments of the 3 
Baltic and the East-Central countries might have been initially enthusiastic about reforms, but have 
limited the speed of restructuring in order to prevent their economies from sliding into a deep 
recession. This experience tends to be neglected in the literature on transition with its inclination to 
conduct the debate “under the misnomer of shock therapy versus gradualism” (Csaba, 2009, p. 
385). According to this approach, delays in the reform process are part of gradualism, often seen as 
reluctance to a needed change observed in the so-called laggard reformers. The latter approximately 
coincide with those CIS countries that that have managed to follow a dual-economy track for much 
longer. In the case of these countries, dualism has appeared to be inescapable in the course of the 
transition process, since (i) the high level of industrialisation inherited from the socialist era made 
the  social  costs  of  restructuring  quite  severe;  (ii)  the  need  to  prevent  the  economy  from 
experiencing mass unemployment in the period necessary to construct a well-functioning market-
based coordination mechanism justified the subsidization of selected enterprises or sectors; (iii) the 
existence  of  political  preferences  and  public  attitudes  hostile—or  at  least  not  particularly 
favourable—towards market-oriented reforms obstructed the emergence of a pure market economy.  
The case of Belarus is illustrative of such dual-economy track. In the industrial sphere, a 
sizeable public sector consisting of state-owned enterprises coexists with a relatively small, but 
viable  modern  sector  comprised  of  small  and  medium-sized  private  companies  and  petty 
entrepreneurs (a few export-oriented companies partially controlled by the state and successfully 
operating in foreign markets can be also included in this dynamic sector). Moreover, ideological 
factors have played an important role in creating a climate not favourable to massive privatization 
and in support of the preservation of state controls over the economy.   
Looking at the future economic prospects of former Soviet republics like Belarus, one of the 
core  issues  is  whether  a  dually-structured  economy  will  be  able  to  grow  in  the  long  run  at  a 
satisfactory rate, or—if unable to do so—whether it will able to revise the boundaries between the 
public and the private domain and between profit-generating and loss-making activities. The time 4 
dimension of the problem is  also very relevant, since sooner  or later  the  dual structure  of the 
economy is likely to collide with its growth capabilities and its external competitiveness: for how 
long  the  functioning  of  the  economy  will  be  considerably  affected  by  the  industries  and  the 
structures inherited from the socialist past? In this paper, we are concerned with these issues, which 
motivate the model whereby we formally analyse the growth performance of a typical transition 
economy characterized by a dual-economy structure. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to a  quick  exploration  of the 
concept of dualism in economic development and to a discussion of how it can be meaningfully 
applied to the transition economies. Some of the stylized facts that may help understanding the 
economic performance of the former Soviet republics are discussed in section 3. Section 4 presents 
the analytical model and section 5 characterizes the equilibrium path of the economy. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. THE CONCEPT OF DUALISM IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC 
TRANSITION 
  A concept of dualism in economic development was originally proposed by Julius Herman 
Boeke (1953) to study the Indonesian economy and society. A typical dual economy consists of two 
sectors: a (small) urban-industrial and a (big) rural-agricultural sector. The manufacturing sector 
displays  features  of  any  modern  industrial  economy,  while  a  much  bigger  agricultural  sector 
surrounding the advanced one is characterised by a primitive mode of production. As a result, 
labour market is split into two parts: one is comprised of relatively well-paid and skilled urban 
workers and the other is full of poorly paid and low-productive rural workers. 
The original models (Furnivall, 1948; Boeke, 1953; Jorgenson, 1961) emphasised one single 
feature  of  dualism,  either  behavioural  or  technological  parameter  differences  between  sectors, 
which produce the single commodity or are characterised by identical demand and demographic 5 
parameters. Later scholars adopted a multidimensional approach and accounted, for instance, for the 
spatial features (Kelley et al., 1972). 
It is widely recognized that Lewis (1954) can be considered a pioneering model of rural-
urban migration. In this framework, the backward rural sector is the supplier of cheap labour to the 
advanced industrial sector. The rapid capital accumulation in industry that drives growth depends 
on  savings.  Lewis  (1954,  p.  155)  argues  that  ‘the  central  problem  in  the  theory  of  economic 
development is to understand the process by which a community which was previously saving and 
investing 4 or  5 percent  of its national income or less, converts itself into an economy where 
voluntary saving is running at about 12 or 15 percent or more’ (Lewis, 1954, p. 155). Later, Lewis 
(1992) explained his inclination towards economic dualism by pointing at a historical puzzle: in 
Britain, during the first fifty years of the industrial revolution, real wages remained more or less 
constant while profits and investment were rising. This is against the neoclassical prediction that all 
three variables should move together. As a matter of fact, Lewis’ concept of dual economy is rooted 
in the classical approach of Smith and Ricardo, according to which there is a virtually ‘unlimited 
supply of labour’ that keeps wages low and profits high (Lewis, 1992, p. 397). Still, the debate has 
remained centred on the labour transfer problem and on the persistence (or shrinking) of the inter-
sectoral wage gap in the course of economic development (Basu, 1997). 
Ranis and Fei (1964) provided the Lewis model with micro-foundations and reformulated it 
in a neoclassical fashion by considering the case where unlimited supply of labour is over and the 
agricultural sector is fully ‘commercialised’. Commercialisation of the traditional sector results in 
the elimination of dualism (Fei and Ranis, 1961; Jorgenson, 1961). Other formulations (Boeke, 
1953;  Baldwin,  1966;  Eckhaus,  1955;  Higgins,  1956)  considered  diminishing—and  not 
disappearing—differences in production conditions through time that result in the mere attenuation 
of dualism. Higgins (1956, p. 106) argues that dualism cannot fully elapse since ‘some degree of 
dualism exists in virtually every economy. Even the most advanced countries, such as Canada and 6 
the United States, have areas in which techniques lag behind those of the most advanced sectors, 
and in which standards of economic and social welfare are correspondingly low’. This conception, 
however, emphasizes the simultaneous presence of well-performing and poorly-performing sectors, 
reflecting  different  stages  of  their  development  as  the  economy  evolves.  In  similar  vein, 
contemporary explorations of dualism (Vollrath, 2009; Turnovsky and Basher, 2009; Rada, 2007) 
stress the existence of factor market inefficiencies that lower the overall productivity and income 
(Vollrath, 2009), bring about ‘the recursive fiscal dilemma’ (Turnovsky and Basher, 2009), but 
without cancelling the possibility of sustainable employment and adequate output and productivity 
growth (Rada, 2007). 
In contrast, we are concerned with the co-existence of sheltered and unsheltered sectors, 
with the latter ‘feeding’ the former in a number of ways. In our model, the government intervenes to 
reallocate value-added collected by taxation from the dynamic sector to the stagnant one. This 
framework, we believe, adequately captures an important pattern that has characterized most post-
Soviet economies in the first years of the transition and that in some countries (such as Belarus) still 
persists.  
Why  to  approach  the  analysis  of  economic  transition  with  the  concept  of  dualism? 
Fundamentally, we argue that dualism emerged out of the Soviet legacy of heavy industrialisation, 
and that the choices made over the years by the countries’ policy makers explains the different pace 
at which the inherited economic structure is eroded and is replaced by a more market-oriented 
economic environment in the various post-Soviet countries. Indeed, nearly all socialist economies 
were heavily industrialised (Lavigne, 1999). Furthermore, plant sizes were extraordinary large. For 
instance,  in  Czechoslovakia,  only  1.4  percent  of  manufacturing  workers  were  employed  at 
enterprises with less than 500 employees as compared to 35 percent in the United States in 1986, 47 
percent in West Germany in 1987, 70 percent in Demark in 1987, and 79 percent in Spain in 1987 
(Myant, 1993; Nielsen, 1996). In Russia, in 1990, there were only 25,000 small enterprises; if the 7 
U.S. economy were taken as a benchmark, there should have been from 300,000 to 400,000 of such 
companies (Nielsen, 1996). 
Large plant size and high industrial concentration were elements of the attempt to revitalise 
the socialist industry and to upgrade its competitiveness that took place since the late 1950s, when 
the  Stalinist  industrialisation  model  had  exhausted  its  developmental  potential.  Other  measures 
included  the  introduction  of  plan  bargaining  (Kornai,  1980),  the  relaxation  of  the  mandatory 
character  of  plans,  self-organisation  experiments  and,  in  the  1980s,  the  imports  of  what  was 
considered as leading technologies from the West (Lavigne, 1999). 
The socialist economies were not dual economies since—despite the combination of central 
planning  and  market  instruments—the  private  sector  was  ‘almost  non-existent  in  the  industrial 
sector, except in Hungary’ (Nielsen, 1996, p. 36). The rapid growth of the private sector started 
only after the collapse of the socialist bloc, mainly thanks to the diffusion of small and medium-size 
enterprises (SMEs) (World Bank, 1996). Large existing entities remained a problem. Their closure 
would have led to mass unemployment and to a very deep recession, since a nascent private sector 
could not have absorbed redundant workers as quickly as their release would have occurred. Hence, 
it  ‘was  politically  impossible  and  economically  pointless’  to  tolerate  a  chain  of  bankruptcies 
(Nielsen,  1996,  p.  71). In  this  situation,  governments  decided to  soften  budget  constraints  and 
postpone privatisation of larger state-owned enterprises. The coexistence of viable private sector of 
SMEs and unreformed industrial giants  led  to the emergence  of a dualistic structure  when the 
transition unfolded. It was not a dichotomy of rural-agricultural and urban-industrial sectors, but of 
sheltered and obsolete state-controlled industrial and unsheltered modern private sectors. 
The  governments  of,  to  mention  some  cases,  Poland  and  Czechoslovakia  (and  later 
Slovakia) delivered ‘subsidies, additional credits at least implicitly guaranteed by the state, various 
kinds of tax relief, and tariff and non-tariff protection’ to state-owned enterprises (Van Brabant, 
1994, p. 77). It was done in an ad hoc manner, in a way divergent from the industrial policy 8 
experience of East Asian tigers, whose application to the former socialist world was considered 
desirable by the scholars of ‘late industrialisation’ (Amsden et al., 1994; Wade, 1996). It was not 
only the lack of resources that made problematic the implementation of such an industrial policy, 
but also the ideological stance against interventionism in general (Eyal et al., 1997) and the fear of 
the formation of special interest groups powerful enough to bargain for special treatment (Kaminski 
and Soltan, 1989; Hausner and Wojtyna, 1993). 
While in the model presented here, the modern sector is the source of subsidies channelled 
to  the  backward  one,  in  East-Central  European  economies  and  in  the  Baltic  States  it  was  the 
banking sector that played an important role in the support of the old industrial structure. National 
governments  tried  to  provide  subsidies  out  of  their  tax  revenues,  but  soon  their  fiscal  deficits 
prevented them from insisting with this policy (Bonin et al., 2004). Preferential tax treatment were 
generally  given  to  private  firms  populating  the  modern  sector  (especially  in  Poland)  so  as  to 
stimulate their growth (Winiecki, 1993). In addition, there were numerous opportunities for tax 
evasion. Taking together, all these features assigned a dominant role in keeping obsolete industrial 
giants afloat to banks, which accumulated bad loans in their portfolios (Sherif et al., 2003). 
However, re-softening of budget constraints did not improved the position of large industrial 
enterprises. Instead, the accumulation of bad loans and the worsening of the fiscal situation forced 
the governments to reverse the dual-track of development by cutting enterprises from the dropping 
bottle of explicit and implicit subsidisation. This time the promise had to be credible enough. The 
solution was the privatisation of the main banks that were sold to their EU counterparts. The Baltic 
States were the pioneers in this process: the Northern European banks became owners of the Baltic 
banking  sector  within  3–4  years  from  the  start  of  the  transition.  In  East-Central  Europe,  the 
Hungarian government finally made a decision on foreign ownership in 1995 (after almost six years 
of resistance and the costly and painful lessons of multiple recapitalisations) (Mihalyi, 2004), the 9 
Czech and Polish governments followed, and Bulgaria and Romania remained behind for a while 
(Sobol, 1998). 
The continuation of dual-track development would have been a feasible option only if the 
subsidized enterprises would have been capable of drastically improving their performance (and in 
general this did not happen), or if the governments would have found additional sources of support. 
For subsidized enterprises, incentives were an obvious issue: as it is well known, the possibility of 
being bailed-out creates a moral hazard problem that can undermine competitive efforts. Moreover, 
the tax systems were not generating enough revenues, and higher tax rates would have suffocated 
the development of dynamic private SMEs. Finally, banks could have become more vulnerable with 
more doubtful loans in their portfolios. As Myant (1993, p. 151) correctly describes the situation, 
‘in  the  view  of  the  state  budget  and  balance  of  payments  problems, [the  dual-track]…strategy 
depended  either  on  very  substantial  external  aid  or  on  the  acceptance  of  a  budget  deficit  and 
possibly of some form of stronger restrictions on imports’. These possibilities were against the 
premises of the reform programs in East-Central Europe. 
In contrast, some countries – particularly the former Soviet Union republics – have managed 
to follow the dual-economy track for a longer period of time. It is not surprising that they have 
generally been behind the East-Central European and the Baltic countries in terms of large-scale 
privatisation and enterprise restructuring as routinely measured by the EBRD scores (EBRD, 2009) 
(see Table 1). One of the paradigmatic cases is Belarus, where a sizeable backward sector of state-
owned  enterprises  still  coexists  with  a  small  and  viable  sector  of  competitive  and  modern 
companies, some of which are also controlled by the state. This case would be illustrated below and 













Average of three indexes of three, 
1996 
ALBANIA  3.67  4.00  2.33  3.33 
ARMENIA  3.67  4.00  2.33  3.33 
AZERBAIJAN  2.00  3.67  2.00  2.56 
BELARUS  1.67  2.33  1.67  1.89 
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA  3.00  3.00  2.00  2.67 
BULGARIA  4.00  4.00  2.67  3.56 
CROATIA  3.33  4.33  3.00  3.55 
ESTONIA  4.00  4.33  3.67  4.00 
FYR MACEDONIA  3.33  4.00  2.67  3.33 
GEORGIA  4.00  4.00  2.33  3.44 
HUNGARY  4.00  4.33  3.67  4.00 
KAZAKHSTAN  3.00  4.00  2.00  3.00 
KYRGYZ 
REPUBLIC  3.67  4.00  2.00  3.22 
LATVIA  3.67  4.33  3.00  3.67 
LITHUANIA  4.00  4.33  3.00  3.78 
MOLDOVA  3.00  4.00  2.00  3.00 
MONGOLIA  3.33  4.00  2.00  3.11 
MONTENEGRO  3.00  3.67  2.00  2.89 
POLAND  3.33  4.33  3.67  3.78 
ROMANIA  3.67  3.67  2.67  3.34 
RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  3.00  4.00  2.33  3.11 
SERBIA  2.67  3.67  2.33  2.89 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC  4.00  4.33  3.67  4.00 
SLOVENIA  3.00  4.33  3.00  3.44 
TAJIKISTAN  2.33  4.00  2.00  2.78 
TURKEY  3.33  4.00  2.67  3.33 
TURKMENISTAN  1.00  2.33  1.00  1.44 
UKRAINE  3.00  4.00  2.33  3.11 
UZBEKISTAN  2.67  3.33  1.67  2.56 
Source: EBRD. 
To summarize, the transition process essentially contains a period of dualistic economic 
development resulting from the socialist pattern of industrialisation and from the natural propensity 
of politicians to resist socially-painful reforms. The length of this period varies. Its briefness in the 
case of East-Central European countries, such as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, can be 
linked to the fact that the governments of these countries stopped channelling massive resources 
towards the backward sector, which was slow to adjust to the new economic conditions. The case of 11 
Belarus is different. In contrast with some of its post-Soviet neighbours (see Table 1), this country 
has made little progress on the way of creating a modern competitive sector. The Baltic states 
represents a useful benchmark for making comparisons: they share with Belarus the same legacy of 
having been part of the Soviet Union and they have started the transition process at the same time, 
but their transition process has been very different. This remains true in the light of the global 
financial crisis, that has revealed elements of fragility in the Baltic economies, once considered the 
‘frontrunners of transformation’ (Csaba, 2009).   
 
3. THE PERSISTENCE OF DUALISM: STYLIZED FACTS 
One of the essential conditions for a dual economy to function is the availability of sufficient 
resources for redistribution. The latter can take place through the government budget. Belarus has 
been ahead of other transition economies in terms of the taxes to GDP ratio. In Belarus, between 
1994 and 2008, tax revenues accounted on average for 47 percent of GDP, while in the Baltic states 
the corresponding figure was around 37 percent (see Figure 1).  
There are also considerable differences in the principles inspiring the tax systems and in the 
modes of tax collection. 
The structure of taxation reflects the divergent approaches to transition. In the former Soviet 
Union republics, tax systems are based on taxing enterprises, goods and services, in line with the 
legacy  of  an  industrial  structure  of  large  monopolistic  enterprises,  coupled  with  low  levels  of 
economic development and no realistic chance of joining the EU. In contrast, the East-Central 
European  countries  and  the  Baltic  states  diverted  from  the  old  socialist  pattern  of  taxation  by 
relying on personal taxes, thus bringing their tax systems in line with those of the West European 
states’ (Gehlbach, 2008).  
Differences in the modes of tax collection are also important. The latest World Bank’s report 
‘Paying Taxes-2010’ (World Bank, 2010) constructs an index measuring tax systems from the point 12 
of view of a domestic company complying with different laws and regulations. Belarus is placed the 
last (183
rd) among all the countries studied in terms of tax rates, the amount of hours needed for 
accounting purpose and the number of payments. In Belarus, it is estimated that more than 900 
hours per year are spent to calculate and pay taxes (there are 107 different payments a company 
may be subject to), while the percentage of profit taxed is 99.7 percent. In contrast, for Lithuania, 
these  figures  are  166  hours,  12  payments  and  42.7  percent  of  profit,  for  Latvia  279  hours,  7 
payments and 33 percent of profit, and for Estonia 81 hours, 10 payments, and 49.1 percent of profit 
(World Bank, 2010). Also, in 2009, about 12 percent of all employed in Belarus were accountants 





























































Figure 1: Tax revenues to GDP in the transition economies in 2008 
Source: EBRD 
 
Taxation is not the only way to collect funds necessary for subsidies. Support comes in the 
form of the unequal treatment of private and state-owned companies. An early – but very typical – 
example is still valid today: in Belarus, in 1996, 143 state-owned enterprises were granted ad hoc 
tax exemptions, notably from the VAT and customs duties, 155 enterprises benefited from tax 13 
deferments, while collective farms were given an opportunity to purchase oil and raw materials with 
the  postponement  of  payments  until  the  next  year  (IMF,  1998).  There  is also  pervasive  cross-
subsidisation as selected state-owned companies pay less for electricity and other utilities. 
In Belarus, private companies often encounter corruption. Transparency International (2010) 
ranks Belarus 127th in its world rating of corruption. According to a survey made among private 
SMEs (Glambotskaya et al., 2010), about 70 percent of them give bribes. This is a rather stable 
figure unchanging over a number of years. As for large private firms, about 60 percent of them 
bribe officials (e.g. sanitary and safety inspectors) on a regular basis. Also, companies are often 
engaged  in  indirect  corruption  schemes,  such  as  kickbacks.  Taken  together,  the  confiscatory 
character  of  the  tax  system,  bribes  and  kickbacks  represent  a  burden  which  represses  the 
development of a dynamic private sector. 
How are the tax revenues translated into subsidies and who are their recipients in Belarus? It 
is difficult to construct a consistent time series since the budgetary classification of expenditures 
was  changed. It is only over  the  period  1993–1997 that national accounts  provide  the data  on 
government subsidies. In that period, their average volume amounted to 6.4 percent of GDP. Since 
2006  onwards,  the  national  statistical  body  has  calculated  the  ‘expenditures  on  the  national 
economy’. In 2008, this figure reached 12.8 percent of GDP, or about 26 percent of the government 
budget. Among other items, it includes the subsidies spent to support loss-making companies.
1  
The  IMF  provides  a  number  of  estimates  of  quasi-fiscal  expenditures  spent  in  order  to 
support sectors and individual enterprises. These expenditures were mainly in the form of directed 
and subsidised credits of the National Bank, following the instructions of the executive authorities. 
The quasi-fiscal expenditures were estimated to be 2.5 percent of GDP in 1996 and 3.7 percent in 
1997. The IMF reports estimates for later years (IMF, 1999, 2000, 2001), and the figure typically 
                                                            
1 All the data here and thereafter are from various statistical bulletins published by the Ministry of Statistics of Belarus, 
later transformed into the Belarusian Statistical Committee, or Belstat. 14 
fluctuates around 3 percent of GDP. Although the directed loans from the National Banks were 
abolished, they have been resurrected in other forms and been channelled through the major state 
banks financing state investment programs. This practice has been even intensified as a response to 
the global economic crisis (Kruk and Chubrik, 2010). 
A useful insight can be obtained from the analysis of the demand for subsidies in Belarus. 
Here, recipients are often backward, uncompetitive and loss-making companies. On average, over 
the period 1994–2008, about 17 percent of enterprises in the economy were loss-making, with total 
losses amounting approximately to 3.7 percent of GDP. These losses need to be covered, and this 
figure  falls  within  the  range  of subsidies that  such enterprises may receive.  In 2001,  about  33 
percent of companies were making losses, while these losses amounted to almost 7 percent of GDP.  
Further  supporting  evidence  is  the  existence  of  sizeable  stocks  of  unsold  goods  by 
enterprises. They continue to produce output, thus positively contributing to GDP, but being unable 
to sell their goods and having troubles with debt repayment and the acquisition of needed amounts 
of circulating capital. Between 2001 and 2008, the average volume of stocks in industry amounted 
to 58 percent of total monthly industrial output, or about 3.6 percent of GDP. 
Why does the government goes on with a policy of subsidisation that requires an ever-
growing volume of resources? Economically, these policies are rather costly and might threaten 
macroeconomic stability. However, it should not be ignored that taxation and spending are perhaps 
the most effective economic instruments in the hands of politicians to remain in power. Indeed,  
politicians’ decisions on taxes and subsidies inevitably reflect the effort to reach compromises and 
to build consensus among the various economic and social groups (Steinmo, 1993; Mares, 2006). 
One could claim that the authoritarian polity of the Belarusian government, which maintains 
control over the economy, may reflect some deep popular preferences (Eke and Kuzio, 2000). In 
contrast, the populations of the democratic countries in transition might prefer lower degrees of 
intervention and thus a somewhat ‘smaller’ state. As a matter of fact, Belarus displayed much 15 
smaller figures of public support for free market institutions than those displayed by, for instance, 
the Baltic States (see Figure 2). Indeed, even authoritarian governments cannot simply ignore public 
attitudes and impose their will in a top-down fashion. There is an ample evidence that autocracies 
hold elections and care about the support of the public (Linz, 2000; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2001; 
Cox, 2009; Miller, 2009). Furthermore, political business cycles that are typically displayed by 
democracies (Nordhaus, 1975; Alesina and Roubini, 1997) are also observed in non-democracies 
(see Magaloni, 2006, for Mexico, and Blaydes, 2008, for Egypt). A wage-based political business 
cycle is recorded in Belarus,
2 where the government increases wages just before the occurrence of 
important political events such as referenda and elections. The public support figures tend to closely 
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Figure 2: Support for free market institutions, average of 1991–1997 
Source: EastEurobarometer, subsequent years. 
                                                            
2 A wage-driven cycle is possible since the government heavily influences wage determination. In Belarus, wage setting 
is institutionalized in the form of a ‘wage grid’, which is a ‘tariff system’ of the sets of coefficients corresponding to the 
27 established ranks of employees. The ratio between the highest and the lowest rank is currently about 7.8. The 
qualifications for every rank are approved by the Institute of Labour of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection. 
The government sets the first-rate tariff, so changes in the first grade automatically affect all other grade levels. 
 16 
Wages  are  important  because  they  are  the  major  source  of  income  for  the  majority  of 
households (Chubrik and Haiduk, 2007). Despite the large public economy, the social policies are 
not  designed  to  generously  support  the  poor  and  the  unemployed  (Chubrik  et  al.,  2009). 
Unemployment benefits in Belarus remain among the lowest across the transition economies. For 
instance, in September 2010, this average level of this benefit amounted to about Euro 12 per 
month, or just 19 percent of the survival wage, which is almost equal to the subsistence minimum. 
The Household Budget Surveys report even smaller figures: in 1995, the average unemployment 
benefit was equal to 8.2 percent of the average wage, while in 2008 only to 3.8 percent. In addition, 
over the years, less than 50 percent of the unemployed has received this scarce benefit, while its 
duration rarely exceeds six months. In contrast, for example in Lithuania, the benefit level varied 
from Euro 39 to Euro 72 per month until 2005 (Cazes and Nesporova, 2007), and later increased so 
as to reach 41 percent of the  average wage in 2009 (about Euro 260). 
 
 
Figure 3: The dynamics of real USD-denominated wages and the popular support in 
Belarus, 1995–2007 
 
Source:  calculations  are  made  on  the  basis  of  the  data  taken  from  the  Belarusian  Statistical 
Committee and the National Bank of Belarus; Black line shows the dynamics of USD-denominated 
wage, while the grey line depicts the changes in the presidential rating. The rating is calculated as 
the  share  of  affirmative  answers  to  a  question  ‘Whom  would  you  vote  for  if  the  presidential 
elections are held today?’ The survey is conducted by a major independent sociological laboratory, 




















































































































USD wage  Public support 17 
 
In general, the welfare state in Belarus used to be smaller than in other transition economies, 
and only in 2005 it slightly exceeded the levels of Latvia and Lithuania (see Figure 4). This is 
because  employment  is  set  to  be  the  priority  and  the  government  does  not  want  to  destroy 
productive facilities, apparently hoping that the economy could be reintegrated into the production 
networks of the former Soviet republics. Indeed, the vast majority of manufacturing exports still 
falls onto the Russian market (Tochitskaya and Shymanovich, 2009). Some enterprises are clearly 
supported for the purpose of preventing poverty, especially in the so-called ‘mono-towns’ built in 
the former USSR to serve one particular plant (Haiduk et al., 2004). Actually, their closure can 









































































































To summarise, in Belarus the government policies with regard to wage setting and social 
protection are conducted without considering its inflationary consequences and the inefficiencies 
brought about by the need to cover losses at the expense of the profit-making privately-owned 
enterprises.  Instead  of  restructuring  obsolete  industries  and to  implement  a  system  of  transfers 
aimed at protecting the unemployed and the poor, the government prefers to subsidize loss-making 18 
enterprises. This approach has worked for a period of time, since the country was able to achieve a 
satisfactory increase of per capita income and a decent rate of economic growth (see Figure 5), but 
the  arrival  of  the  global  economic  crisis  has  revealed  the  deficiencies  that  stem  from  a  dual 
economy,  such  as  the  worsening  competitiveness  due  to  the  lagged  modernisation  (Kruk  and 







































































































































Figure 5: Average growth rates in selected transition economies, 1998 – 2008 
Source: EBRD 
 
4. THE MODEL 
  In the economy under consideration, there is a private sector consisting of profit-maximising 
firms that are taxed by the government, and a state-controlled sector consisting of firms that are 
managed in the interest of their employees and are subsidised by the government. This arrangement 
can be explained by the fact that the workers of the state-controlled firms are a key constituency for 
the ruling politicians, which are those who appoint the managers of these enterprises and decide on 
taxation and public subsidies. In this economy, the workers consume entirely their earnings and can 
be employed in the private or in the state-controlled sector, the investors decide on the fraction of 19 
their income to devote to the accumulation of capital, and the government taxes the private sector 
for making transfers to the subsidized firms. Both types of firms produce the same product, and this 
single good can be used both for consumption and for capital investment. The market for this good 
is perfectly competitive. Also the market in which firms rent the capital that is accumulated by the 
investors is perfectly competitive. In contrast, the labour market is segmented: workers employed in 
the state-controlled sector cannot be replaced by outsiders and their wages are set so as to maximise 
their expected income, while in the private sector wage determination is perfectly competitive. 
Time is discrete and the time horizon is infinite. Finally, there is no source of random disturbances 
and agents’ expectations are rational (in the sense that they are consistent with the true processes 
followed by the relevant variables), thus implying perfect foresight. 
Profit-maximising firms 
  There is a large number (normalised to be one) of identical firms that maximise their profits. 
In each period t, they produce the single good Yt according to the following technology:  
1 0    , K L A Y - 1
pt pt pt pt < < = α α α ,                           (1) 
where Ypt are the units of good Yt produced by the private firms, Lpt and Kpt are, respectively, the 
labour input and the capital stock used by a private firm to produce Ypt, and Apt is a variable 
measuring the state of technology of a private firm. It is assumed that Apt is a positive function of 
the  capital  installed  in  the  entire  private  sector  of  the  economy:  α
pt pt K A = .
3  This  assumption 
combines the idea that learning-by-doing works through each firm’s capital investment and the idea 
that knowledge and productivity gains spill over instantly across firms (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995). Therefore, in accordance with Frankel (1962), it is supposed that although Apt is endogenous 
                                                            
3  Consistently with this formal set-up, one can interpret technological progress as labor augmenting. 20 
to the private sector of the economy, each firm takes it as given, since a single firm’s decisions have 
only a negligible impact on the aggregate stock of capital of the private sector.
4  
In each period t, the representative private firm employs labour and rents capital so as to 
maximize its net (of taxes) profits, πpt, that are given by 
πpt=(1-τt)Ypt-WptLpt-RtKpt,   0≤τt<1,                                            (2) 
where τt is a value-added tax rate, and Wpt and Rt are, respectively, the wage rate paid by a private 
firm and the rental rate on capital. Notice that Yt is the numéraire of this economy and that its price 
is normalized to be one. 
State-controlled firms  
   There is a large number (normalised to be one) of identical firms that are controlled and 
subsidised by the government. In each period t, they produce the single good Yt according to the 
following technology 
1 0      , K L Y
- 1
st st st < < = β
β β ,                                                    (3) 
where Yst are the units of good Yt produced by the state-controlled firms, and Lst and Kst are, 
respectively, the labour input and the capital stock used by a state-controlled firm to produce Yst. 
Notice that total factor productivity is assumed to be time invariant: one may think that in the state-
controlled sector there is no incentive to generate productivity gains (no learning-by-doing).
5 
In each period t, the representative state-controlled firm employs labour and rents capital so 
as to maximise the expected income of its typical employee, ptWst, where Wst is the wage rate paid 
                                                            
4 This amounts to say that technological progress is endogenous to the private sector of the economy, although it is 
unintended by-products of firms’ capital investment rather than the result of purposive R&D efforts. 
5 One may generalise this assumption by stating that even state-controlled firms are able to generate productivity gains, 
but that they are less effective than private firms in generating them.   21 
by a state-controlled firm, and pt is the probability of employment in t for a typical employee of a 
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t                                                             (4) 
where Mt are the employees of a state-controlled firm in t (its workforce). The workforce of a state-
controlled firm is assumed to coincide with the workers employed by the firm in the previous 
period who have not retired: 
 Mt+1=(1-η)Lst, 0<η<1,  M0 given,                                        (5) 
where η is the fraction of the workers employed in the state-controlled sector in each period that 
retire at the end of the period.  
  The representative state-controlled firm is subject to the following budget constraint: 
St+Yst-WstLst-RtKst≥0,                                  (6) 
where  St is the subsidy that a state-controlled firm receives from the government in t. 
Investors 
  There  is  a  large  number  (normalised  to  be  one)  of  identical  investors.  In  each  t,  the 
representative investor chooses its sequences of consumption { }
∞
=t n In C  and investment { }
∞
=t n n I  in 







t - n 1 θ 0    ), C ln( θ ,                                                        (7) 
subject to CIt+It≤RtKt and Kt+1=It+Kt(1-δ),  0<δ<1,  K0  given,  
where Kt is the investors’ stock of capital in t, θ is a time-preference parameter and δ is a capital 
depreciation parameter. 22 
Government 
  In each period the government must balance its budget: 
St=τtYpt.                                                                       (8) 










 tends to diminish with 
Mt, while it is plausible that the pressure exerted on the political authorities by the employees of the 
state-controlled sector tends to increase with their number Mt, it is reasonable to model the tax rate 
whereby  the  government  finances  the  subsidies  in  favour  of  the  state-controlled  firms  as  an 
increasing function of Mt: 
0 ) 0, (   , 0    , 0    , 0   0,    , ) , M (
t t M M t t = > > > > = γ γ γ τ γ γ f f f f f .                        (9) 
The parameter γ captures the propensity of the political system to favour the state-controlled sector 
relatively  to  the  private  sector,  which  depends  on  values,  ideologies  (preferences  for  market 
reforms…). In particular, the impact of a larger Mt on τt tends to be stronger whenever γ is greater. 
  A  possible  functional  specification  consistent  with  (9)  is  the  following: 
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 = γ γ γ f ,  where  N  is  the  size  of  the  entire  working 
population (for simplicity, it is assumed to remain fixed in time). 
Markets equilibrium 
Equilibrium in the market for the single good requires 
                  CWt+CIt+It=Ypt+Yst,                                               (10) 
where CWt is workers’ consumption in t (the workers consume entirely their earnings). 
Equilibrium in the private segment of labour market requires 
Lpt=N-Mt.                                                                        (11) 
  Equilibrium in the capital market requires 23 
Kpt+Kst=Kt.                                                                     (12) 
 
5. THE EQUILIBRIUM PATH OF THE ECONOMY 
  Solving the agents’ optimization problems, we obtain the equations that—together with the 
market-equilibrium conditions (10)-(12)—must be satisfied along an equilibrium path:  
1 -
pt pt t pt L K )] , M ( - 1 [ W α γ α f = ,                                                    (13) 





st pt pt t
st M
K R - M K L K ) , M (
W
β β α γ +
=
f
,                               (15) 
β β β t
-
st t M K ) - 1 ( R = ,                                                           (16) 
Lst=Mt,                                (17) 
t t t 1 t 1 t 1 t
1 t
I - K R
1
I - K R





,                                             (18) 
Kt+1=It+Kt(1-δ),                                                             (19) 
) - 1 ( M M t 1 t η = + ,                                                           (20) 
Equations  (13)  and  (14)  give  us  the  optimality  conditions  of  a  private  firm  with  respect  to, 
respectively, the choice of labour and the choice of capital. Equation (15) is derived from the budget 
constraint of a state-controlled firm. Equations (16) and (17) are derived from the solution of the 
optimization problem of a state-controlled firm (see the Appendix to check that it is always optimal 
for a state-controlled firm to employ its entire workforce). Equation (18) is derived from the Euler 
equation  that  we  obtain  from  the  solution  of  the  investor’s  optimisation  problem  (see  the 
Appendix). Equations (19) and (20) give us the laws of motion of, respectively, the capital stock 
and the workforce of the state-controlled sector.      24 





Z ≡  that govern the equilibrium path of the economy: 
0 ) - 1 ( M -  M ) M , (M t 1 t t 1 t = = Λ + + η ,                                      (21) 
{ }
, 0
Z - ) M - N )]( , M ( - 1 )[ - 1 (
) Z ( 1
-
Z - ) M - N )]( , M ( - 1 )[ - 1 (
- 1 ) M - N )]( , M ( - 1 )[ - 1 (
      
) Z , M , Z , M (
t t t
t
1 t 1 t 1 t
1 t 1 t










γ α γ α








t t t K
K - K
- Z ) Z ( + ≡ = = ρ δ g .
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  Given (21)-(22), one can easily demonstrate the following proposition concerning long-run 
growth in this economy: 
Proposition 1 The asymptotic rate of real GDP growth depends neither on the initial size of the 
workforce employed in the state-controlled sector nor on the propensity of the political system to 
favour  this  sector  relatively  to  the  private  sector,  but  only  on  the  structural  parameters  of  the 
economy. 
Proof  By  inspecting  (21),  one  can  immediately  check  that  along  an  equilibrium  path 

















  (consider  that  α α N ) - 1 ( R =   and  see  equation  (16)), 




 (consider that M=0 and Ks=0, and see equations (3) and (17)). Hence, if  Z Zt →  
as  ∞ → t , equation (22) reduces to  δ δ α θ α - Z 1 ] - 1 )N - 1 [( + = +  as  ∞ → t , thus giving  
                                                            
6  Notice  that  equation  (22)  can  be  obtained  by  using  (11),  (14)  and  (17)  to  rewrite  (18)  as 
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g , where Z 
is given by (23) and depends neither on M0 nor on γ, but only on α, δ, θ and N. 
  An implication of Proposition 1 is that economies sharing the same structural features, but 
differing because of the relative size of their state-controlled sector and of the propensity of their 
political system to protect the employees of the state-controlled enterprises, should converge in the 
very long run to the same growth rate.  
  For studying the transitional path along which the economy moves from period 0 onwards, 
we  linearise  the  system  (21)-(22)  around  ( ) ) - 1 ( ) - (1 - )N - 1 ( Z 0, M δ θ α θ α = = .  The  linearised 
system thus obtained has only one trajectory converging to  ( ) ) - 1 ( ) - (1 - )N - 1 ( Z 0, M δ θ α θ α = = , 
which is governed by (see the Appendix for the derivation) 
t
0 t ) - 1 ( M M η = ,                                                               (24) 
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,                  (25) 
where  ) - 1 ( ) - (1 - )N - 1 ( Z δ θ α θ α =   and  the  partial  derivative 
t M f   is  evaluated  at 
( ) ) - 1 ( ) - (1 - )N - 1 ( Z 0, M δ θ α θ α = = .     
  Given (24)-(25), the following proposition holds: 
Proposition 2 Along the transitional path, the rate of investment is lower if the initial size of the 
workforce employed in the state-controlled sector is larger (larger M0) and/or if the political system 
has  a  more  accentuated  ideological  propensity  to  protect  the  employees  of  the  state-controlled 
sector (greater γ). 26 













(recall that  0
t M > γ f ). 
  Proposition 2 reflects the fact that in this economy everything that induces the policy makers 
to devote more resources to subsidise the state-controlled enterprises tends to depress the incentive 
to invest: it is only in the very long run (i.e., when the influence of the interests connected to the 
state-controlled enterprises on the policy makers has faded away) that M0 and γ do not exert any 
downward effect on capital investment and growth. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In some transition economies, the legacy of the state-controlled heavy industries has fed the 
propensity to experiment with a re-softening of budget constraints. In particular, this paper suggests 
that the experience of the transition economies can be productively understood in terms of dualistic 
development. In these dual economies, an obsolete sector of state-controlled—often loss-making—
enterprises coexists along with a viable sector of relatively efficient, competitive firms providing 
tax revenues that the government utilize to subsidy the loss-makers. This pattern has a political 
backing: politicians are reluctant to restructure due to their propensity to protect the employees of 
the  obsolete  state-controlled  enterprises  and  to  their  ideological  preferences  over  the  depth  of 
market reforms. In other words, the policy makers  have capitalised on the public concern for job 
security, and converted this concern into a broader unreceptiveness towards neo-liberal reforms. 
Some  countries  have  moved  away  from  this  trajectory  rather  quickly  (the advanced  reformers, 
especially  Poland  and  the  Czech  Republic),  while  others  (a  number  of  former  Soviet  Union 
republics, and particularly Belarus) have not (yet) diverted from this path. 
The model presented here  shows that, in those  economies where the policy makers are 
particularly  concerned  with  the  protection  of  the  obsolete  state-controlled  enterprises,  capital 27 
investment and economic growth are dampened along the transitional path. Determinants of the 
policy  makers’  attitudes  towards  the  state-controlled  industries  are  the  fraction  of  the  entire 
workforce that is employed in these industries and their ideological orientation with respect to the 
neo-liberal reforms. Therefore, the model predicts that—ceteris paribus—the larger is the initial 
share of the workforce that is employed in the obsolete sector and the stronger is the degree of 
ideological hostility towards a pure market economy widespread in the population, the lower is the 
speed at  which  a  transition  economy  will  converge  to  the  income  level  of  the  most advanced 
countries.      
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Solution of the optimization problem of the representative state-controlled firm 
By using (3) ad (6), the problem of the representative state-controlled firm can be rewritten as 
st t
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.                                          (A2) 
Given (A1) and (A2), it is necessarily the case that only Lst=Mt maximizes  st tW p . 
Solution of the optimisation problem of the representative investor 
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 with respect to It, Kt+1 and the Lagrange multiplier λt, and 
then by eliminating λt, thus obtaining (18) and (19). An optimal path must also satisfy the transversality 
condition 
0










.                                                       (A3) 
Derivation of the linearised system (24)-(25) 
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f , where Q is a constant whose value has to be 
determined, one can find the system governing the saddle path:  
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By setting t=0 in equation (A4), one can use the initial condition M0 to compute:  
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Finally, by using (A6) for substituting Q in (A4)-(A5), one obtains (24)-(25). 
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